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LAWFUL OBJECTS OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
JOSEPH WOOL
I. Introductory Material
The question has arisen as to what use can be made of
records seized by means of a search warrant, in the course
of raids on gambling establishments, in criminal prosecu-
tions under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. With the in-
creasing occurrence of raids, and searches and seizures inci-
dent thereto, the problem is becoming acute and thus wort'hy
of discussion. The cases upon the subject of searches and
seizures being "thrice legion", the writer has attempted to
collect a sampling of the cases most closely touching upon
t-he original topic. However, due to the interrelation of the
many aspects of the subject, it has been necessary to broad-
en the field of research to some degree, and other points
will be discussed when necessary.
If the property sought to be seized is the proper subject
of seizure it can be seized either pursuant to a valid search
warrant or incident to a lawful arrest, as the cases cited in
this article indicate. Thus the basic problem is what prop-
erty may be seized and, more narrowly, what books and
records of an individual may be seized.
As an introduction to the problem the following quota-
tion is offered:
"*** Assuming the otherwise lawful character of a
search and seizure, a question may still exist as to its
permissible scope as to personal property sought out and
taken. In this connection, authorities usually indicate
that any property may be seized which will furnish
proof of the crime. Some authorities, however, employ
more restricted language, declaring that property the
possession, ownership, and use of which is not prohibited
by law cannot be seized merely for use as evidence. The
Supreme Court of the United States has led in circum-
scribing the objects of lawful search and seizure, at
least in so far as the seizure of evidentiary articles is
concerned, declaring that search warrants may not be
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used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or
office and papers solely for the purpose of searching to
secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or
penal proceeding. ***" 1
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States, which is of primary concern here, provides as
follows:
"*** The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.***"1 2
In close relation to this amendment is that part of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guaranteeing that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 3
Also bearing upon the subject of search and seizure is
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
"grounds for issuance" of a search warrant are as follows:
"*** A warrant may be issued under this rule to
search for and seize any property
(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of
the United States; or
(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used as the means of committing a criminal of-
fense; or
(3) Possessed, controlled or designed or intended for
use or which is or has been used in violation of Title 18,
U.S.C. § 957." 4
1 47 AM. JUR. Searches and Seizures § 54 (1943); footnotes omit-
ted.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
I FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 ('b); 18 U.S.C. § 957 relates to possession of
property in aid of a foreign government.
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The grounds for return of and suppression of property5
obtained by unlawful seizure are:
"*** 1) The property was illegally seized without
warrant, or 2) the warrant is insufficient on its face,
or 3) the property seized is not that described in the
warrant, or 4) there was not probable cause for believ-
ing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant
was issued, or 5) the warrant was illegally executed." 6
II. Seizure of private records and papers-Evidentiary ma-
terials versus Instrumentalities-Supreme Court law on
the subject.
Coming now to the main question, to what extent may
private papers and records be searched for and seized? It
is necessary to retreat to the Nineteenth Century in order
to discover the basic law upon the subject.
Boyd v. United States 7 sets forth the basic law and rea-
soning upon -the subject. The Boyd case concerned an in-
formation filed in a cause of seizure and forfeiture of prop-
erty -under the law relating to the defrauding of the Reve-
nue Laws. During the course of the proceeding a party was
compelled by court order to produce an invoice of certain of
the property sought to be seized and forfeited. The court
commented in the following manner, holding the compul-
sion unreasonable:
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forefeited
goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid
the payment thereof, are totally different things from
a search for and seizure of a man's private books and
papers for the purpose of attaining information there-
in contained, or of using them as evidence against
him. * * * In the one case the government is entitled
to the possession of the property; in the other it is not." 8
5 FED. R. GRIM. P. 41 (g) defines property to include, "documents,
books, papers and any other tangible objects."
6 FED. R. GRIM. P. 41 (e).
7 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8 Id. at 623.
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And further:
"We have already noticed the intimate relation be-
tween the two amendments. They throw great light on
each other. For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures'
condemmed in the fourth amendment are almost always
made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evi-
dence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man
'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,'
which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable
search and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that
the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself.
We think it is within the clear intent and meaning of
those terms." 9
The next step in the development of the law on the point
is Gouled v. United States.10 In Gouled, a case involving a
charge of conspiracy to defraud the government, papers
were taken from the defendant's office under two search
warrants. The Court points out that search warrants were
in use at the time the constitution was adopted, and used
to seach and seize such objects as stolen or forfeited proper-
ty, property liable for duties and concealed to avoid payment
of them, excisable articles and books required by law to be
kept with respect to them, burglars' tools and weapons, and
implements of gambling.
The Court, however, clearly limited the objects of a
search warrant stating that a search warrant can not be
used solely for the purpose of making a search of a man's
property solely to secure evidence to be used against him
in a criminal proceeding. With regard to papers or docu-
ments the Court declared that such property might be
9 Id. at 633.
10 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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seized as any other property when it fell within the princi-
ples of lawful search and seizure.
As to the papers involved in this case, the court held an
unexecuted contract was not of such interest to the govern-
ment that it should be taken into possession to prevent in-
jury to the public from its use. The unexecuted contract
was determined to be solely of evidentiary value. The same
conclusion was reached with regard to an attorney's bill
for legal services. Discussing an executed written contract,
the Court realized that it might be "an -important agency or
instrumentality in the bribing of a public servant and in
perpetrating frauds upon the government," but as no such
facts appeared -in the certificate relating to the affidavits
and search warrants, the Court held the executed written
contract to be of only evidentiary value and subject to ob-
jection at trial.
The Gouled decision also sets forth the rule that if the
property seized be a proper subject of seizure, and the form
of the search warrant satisfied the law, then the use of
the property so obtained as evidence in a different criminal
prosecution from that set out in the affidavits of the search
warrant would be entirely proper.
The prohibition era denoted a broadening of the law of
searches and seizures as evidenced by the case of Carroll v.
United States," which held legal the seizure of contraband
liquor being illegally transported, regardless of the penalty,
with or without search or arrest warrants, provided that
the reasonable and probable cause requirement was satis-
fied.
The next important case to deal with records as the
object of search and seizure was Marron v. United States.12
This case involved charges of conspiracy "to commit vari-
ous offenses against the national prohibition act, including
the maintenanbe of a nuisance * * *." The Supreme Court
11 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
12 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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held that, while the seizure of a ledger and certain bills
from a speak-easy was not justifiable under the description
contained in the search warrant, it was lawful as an inci-
dent to the arrest of one engaged in a conspiracy to main-
tain a nuisance. The Court reasoned that the ledger and
bills were, if not essential to the maintenance of the liquor
nuisance, a part of the outfit used to commit the crime. In
this manner the Supreme Court opened up the "objects
used to carry on the crime" classification to records and
papers.
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 3 Marron was
distinguished. The arrest in Go-Bart was made upon an ar-
rest warrant. The arresting officers then forced the person
alleged to have conspired to commit a nuisance against the
United States to open his desk and safe, from which the
officers seized books and papers. The arrest warrant was
held invalid on its face. The Court distinguished the Mar-
ron case on the basis that in that case the records were lying
in the open and not locked up, that in Marron a conspiracy
was being committed in the arresting officers' presence
while in Go-Bart there was no criminal act being committed
in the officers' presence, and that in Marron the officers
were on the premises lawfully, in the course of a search
under a valid search warrant. In Go-Bart the search was
deemed of a general exploratory nature, and thus unreason-
able and within the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment.
A second case distinguishing Marron was United States
v. Lefkowitz. 14 In Lefkowitz the officers arrested the oc-
cupants of a room on a warrant for conspiracy to violate
the liquor laws, and seized as an incident to such arrest
private notebooks, papers and other articles. The Court
found that no conspiracy was being committed in the offi-
cers' presence, nor was there a nuisance being maintained
on the premises, and condemned the search as general and
exploratory, and made only to find evidence of the occu-
13 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
14 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
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pant's guilt of the crime of conspiracy. The Court com-
mented as follows:
"Respondent's papers were wanted by the officers
solely for use as evidence of crime of which respondents
were accused or suspected. They could not lawfully be
searched for and taken even under a search warrant is-
sued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such
things and disclosing exactly where they were. Gouled
v. United States * * *."
"These searches and seizures are to be distinguished
from the seizure of a ledger and some bills that was sus-
tained in the Marron case. There, prohibition officers
lawfully on the premises searching for liquor described
in a search warrant, arrested the bartender for crimes
openly being committed in their presence. * * * While
no use was being made of the book or papers at the mo-
ment of the arrest, they-like containers, chairs * * *-
were kept to be utilized when needed. The facts dis-
closed in the opinion were held to justify the inference
that when the arrest was made the ledger and bill were
in use to carry on the criminal enterprise." 25
The Court went on to state that, though these articles
were intended for use in a criminal purpose, they were in
themselves unoffending, and condemned the search as one
for evidence citing U.S. v. Boyd.
At this point in the cases it is evident that books, rec-
ords, and papers can be the proper subject of seizure. How-
ever, the language of the cases is equally clear that such
property cannot be seized solely for their value as evidence.
The point made by the Gouled case that such property could
be seized when it fell within the rules of lawful seizure-
such as stolen records-was explained somewhat by the
Marron case which indicated that papers could be the in-
strumentality of a crime. The two cases following the Mar-
'5 Id. at 464.
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ron case, and distinguishing it, have rendered doubtful the
question of what is an instrumentality.
The case of Harris v. United States 16 is the next signifi-
cant statement by the Supreme Court upon the subject. In
Harris there was a search incident to the arrest of the de-
fendant for mail fraud and for violation of the National
Stolen Property Act. Searching the defendant and the
premises under his control, an apartment, for cancelled
checks used in committing the offense, the arresting offi-
cers found certain draft cards in a bedroom. The defen-
dant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it
had been obtained by means of an unreasonable search and
seizure. The Court held the search and seizure reasonable
stating:
"* * * the objects sought for and those actually dis-
covered were properly subject to seizure. This court
has frequently recognized the distinction between mere-
ly evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may
not be seized either under the authority of a search war-
rant, or during the course of a search incident to ar-
rest, and on the other hand, those objects which may
validly be seized including the instrumentalities and
means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime
such as stolen property, weapons by which escape of the
person arrested might be affected, and property the pos-
session of which is a crime." 17
The draft cards were recognized to be contraband, and
the court indicated that the very possession of them was an
offense against the United States. Thus a crime was being
committed in the presence of the officers, and the fact that
the draft cards were not related to the crime from which
the arrest stemmed was of no importance.
The Harris case stresses the importance of a valid entry
upon the premises, a valid search warrant or valid arrest,
16 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
17 Id. at 154.
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and indicates the extent to which the Supreme Court will
go to justify a seizure under such conditions. A distinction
is recognized, as in the earlier cases, as to what objects are
subject to seizure, and most important the distinction be-
tween evidentiary and other materials is reaffirmed.18
Following Harris is the case of Abel v. United States.'19
The Abel case, arising under the Espionage Act, concerned
a motion to suppress which had been decided against the
defendant in the lower Court. The use of several items was
protested. Some items were seized as an incident of arrest,
some while defendant was in custody, and some in an aban-
doned hotel room. The seizure of the articles found in the
hotel room, a hollowed out pencil and a "cipher" pad, though
admittedly sought only as evidence of espionage, was justi-
fied on the theory of abandonment or as bona vacantia. The
court -indicated that these, as "means" of committing an of-
fense, were seizable.
A piece of paper with code upon it was seized at the time
of the arrest, and such seizure was justified by the court on
the basis that it was an instrumentality of the crime. As
an incident of the arrest, there was also seized a forged
birth certificate which was held to be the means of defen-
dant's taking a false identity for the purpose of espionage,
and thus an instrumentality of crime.
Three more objects, another forged birth certificate, a
forged international certificate of vaccination, and a bank
book were held justifiably seized as incidents of a lawful
search on the same instrumentality reasoning.
In Abel the court continually recognized the need to sat-
isfy the requirement of a valid object of seizure. The dis-
tinction between evidentiary material and lawful objects
of search and seizure was repeated. Harris was supported
by the Supreme Court in Abel as follows:
18 For other statements of the distinction see Rabinowitz v. United
States, 339 U.S. 56, 64 at note 6 (1950).
19 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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"When an article subject to lawful seizure properly
comes into an officer's possession in the course of a law-
ful search it would be entirely without reason to say that
he must return it because it was not one of the things it
was his business to look for. * * *" 20
The above cases have been discussed in order to present
the basic law as set forth by the Supreme Court on this area
of searches and seizures. The narrower problem, as defined
by these cases, is which private papers in a given situation
will be merely evidence of a crime, and which instrumentali-
ties of a crime. The Supreme Court has outlined the ans-
wers, but it is suggested, and it will appear, there is room
for differences among the lower courts.
III. Lower Federal Court Cases which Illustrate the "Limi-
tation on the Fruit" Problem.
The lower court federal cases have been sampled within
this subdivision in order to observe how the "limitation of
the fruit" of lawful searches placed by the Supreme Court
has affected the lower federal system.
A. In United States v. Kaplan,21 a case arising under the
National Prohibition Act, the court noted a relaxing in the
law of searches and seizures. With regard to search war-
rants the court stated as follows:
"While the court in more than one instance has taken
occasion to point to the importance of preserving in their
full vigor these constitutional criteria for a reasonable
search and seizure, it is possible to detect in judicial pro-
nouncements a tendency to lessen the requirement of
particularity both as to place to be searched and prop-
erty to be seized. Especially is this trend noticeable in
cases arising since the Eighteenth Amendment was
adopted." 22
20 Id. at 288.
21 16 F.2d 802 (D.C. Mass. 1926).
22 Id. at 803.
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The court then recognized that the search warrant has
become a lawful instrument in the hands of the government
for certain purposes, among these being "to gain possession
of instruments of crime and other outlawed contraband." 2 3
The case of Furlong vs. United States 24 held a marked
one dollar bill to be property subject to search and seizure
incident to an arrest for violation of the National Prohibi-
tion Act. Discussing defendant's objection on the basis of
the fourth and fifth amendments, the court stated that the
bill was a "factor of the crime and evidence of its commis-
sion." While the court recognized that instrumentalities
might be seized, it adopted the older view of the proper ob-
jects of search and seizure incident to an arrest which in-
cludes "proofs relating to the transaction." Neither Gouled
nor Marron were cited or discussed. Thus this case exhibits
the broad view of proper objects of search and seizure men-
tioned in the American Jurisprudence selection found in
Part I of this article.
The effect of Marron is indicated by the case of Foley V.
United States.25 In Foley books, records, a typewriter and
an adding machine were seized by means of a search war-
rant obtained by officers acting under authority of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. The objects seized were held not to
be mere evidence of a crime, but rather instrumentalities of
a conspiracy against the National Prohibition Act.
The court adopted the "used to carry on" definition of
instrumentalities expressed in Marron.26 In this case, as in
several of the Supreme Court cases, -the conspiracy was in
progress at the time of the search. The court stated:
"*** The things seized were not mere evidence. They
were things actually used in committing the crime of
23 Id.
24 10 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1962).
25 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933).
26 For other cases adopting the standard see: United States v. Pol-
ler, 43 F.2d 911, 913, 74 A.L.R. 1382 (2nd Cir. 1930); United
States v. Brengle, 29 F. Supp. 190, 191 (W.D. Va. 1939).
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conspiracy charged, and considering the extent of the
business done they were even necessary to its commis-
sion. Whether the business was buying and selling liq-
uors or a brokerage between buyers in the United States
and sellers in foreign lands, it was extensive and requir-
ed bookkeeping and other records ***. The typewriter
and adding machine were shown to have been used in
the business by the records made with them. We think
all these cleanly appear to be things used as a means of
carrying on the very extensive conspiracy against the
laws of the United States which was evidently in prog-
ress, and might lawfully be sought for and seized under
a warrant describing them.***"Y 27
The seizures in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz were distinguish-
ed on the basis that they involved forcible exploratory
searches, and were not based upon valid search warrants,
as was the case then under discussion. As shown by Harris
not only must the entry be lawful, but the property seized
must also be the proper object of seizure.2 8 While the court
in Foley was perhaps correct in distinguishing Go-Bart and
Lefkowitz, still these two cases cannot be discounted entire-
ly on the question of what is merely evidentiary, since the
opinions did touch upon the problem.
A list of goods was found to be an instrumentality of the
crime of smuggling in the case of Landau v. United States
Attorney.29 The court found it unnecessary to determine
"whether documents constituting merely evidence may be
seized when discovered in the course of a customs search"
since the list of goods was found to be a necessity in the
type of smuggling then under consideration. The Lefko-
witz case was distinguished on the basis that the documents
in that case were more general and not as necessary to the
crime as the list in Landau.
United States v. Labovitz 30 involved a search warrant
issued upon affidavits which recited that a corporation,
27 Foley v. United States, supra note 25, at 4.
28 Harris v. United States, supra note 16, at 154.
29 82 F.2d 285 (2nd Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936).
30 20 F.R.D. 307 (D. Mass. 1957).
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through the defendant, had made false statements and pre-
sented false records in connection with a claim under a
"cost plus" contract with the Army Signal Corps. The de-
fendant moved to return and suppress the records seized
as a result of the search warrant. True records were seized
as well as false records.
In finding that all the records were "means of commit-
ting a criminal offense" the court reasoned as follows:
"* * * The fact that some of them were legitimate rec-
ords and were not per se harmful or dangerous does not
prevent such a finding. Marron d. United States * * *;
United States v. Poller * * * Instrumentalities do not
lose their character by virtue of the fact that they aided
only during a preliminary stage * * * The inflated, fic-
titious records were used to commit the offense, i.e., to
deceive the government auditors, and the true, or other
records were likewise used directly, i.e., shown to the
government. Both, in combination, were essential.
Seavy's papers [a former accountant of the corporation]
were used indirectly, but as a very important means to
so shape the fictitious * * * records that they would be
consistent with the others * * * No inflated claim could
have been advanced unless records had been produced
to substantiate it, and such could not have been prepared
unless they dovetailed with those pre-existing.* * *" 31
The case of Johnson v. United States 32 presents a situa-
tion analogous to Harris the difference being that the seiz-
ure in the Johnson case arises from a search warrant, and
that in Harris as an incident of an arrest. Searching for var-
ious articles of stolen personalty described in a search war-
rant, the searching officers encountered a credit card issued
in the name of the complaining witness whose stolen prop-
erty had just been found in the defendants possession. The
credit card was seized even though not described in the war-
rant. The court held that given a lawful search, under
search warrant or otherwise, certain things could be seized
31 Id. at 309.
32 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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including the instrumentalities of a crime which the credit
card was held to be. The Harris case was cited for the
"evidentiary materials versus instrumentality" distinction
contained therein.33
The seizure of the credit card not described in the war-
rant might have been justified as easily by denominating
it the seizure of the fruits of crime, stolen property, in the
course of a valid search, citing as authority the Harris case.
The following properties have been held subject to seiz-
ure as instrumentalities of crime in situations involving
raids upon gambling establishments: used numbers tickets,
numbers tickets being processed at the time of the raid, and
unused numbers tickets; 34 adding machine, telephone, rec-
ord books, and receipts; 5 -betting slips, rundown sheets,
and money records; 36 notes, books, and records. 37
s3 For further illustrations of lower federal courts finding property
the instrumentality of a crime, citing Harris v. United States,
supra note 16, see: (Search Warrant) Bryant v. United States,
252 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1958); (Incident to arrest under arrest
warrant) Toscano v. Olesen, 184 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
34 Merritt v. United States, 249 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1957). The court
held that the gambling paraphernalia was property used or in-
tended for use within the meaning of FED. R. GRIM. P. 41 (b)
(2).
35 Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 945 (1961). The court, citing Marron v. United States,
supra note 12, as authority, stated that the records of an illicit
business are the instrumentalities of crime, and that the records
seized in Leahy were of that character. Whether so broad a state-
ment can be drawn from the Marron case is subject to doubt.
However, the fact that a lower court can form such an opinion of
Marron is significant in itself.
36 United States v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 539, 544 (E.D. Penn. 1959)
aff'd 278 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828
(1960). The court recited the rule of Harris v. United States,
supra note 16, at 154, as to what objects may be seized, and held
the records and other property seized to be the means or instru-
mentalities of a criminal offense.
37 United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960) rev'd on other
grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961). In Claney the court was squarely
faced with the questions of whether private books, records, and
papers could be the subject of a search warrant and whether the
property seized was merely evidence, or the instrumentalities of
a crime against the United States. The court held the property
properly subject to seizure on a combination of two grounds. The
first ground was that the gambling paraphernalia was, "a part
of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense(evading the wagering tax)" echoing Marron. The second part
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B. The cases encompassed in this section are cases in
which the courts have indicated that the property seized
was not a proper object of search and seizure. The examp-
les which were chosen were picked with the intent of in-
cluding instances where books and records were among the
objects seized.
A search warrant was the means of entry in a prohibi-
tion era case, Kirvin v. United States.38 The search warrant
described books and papers pertaining to the sale, posses-
sion, or transportation of intoxicating liquors; as well as
the intoxicating liquors. The seizure was made and many
books, papers and records were taken: The court held:
"* * * We cannot agree with the government's argu-
ment that the records were means or an instrument of
crime. They might be some evidence of crime. Gouled
v. U.S. * * * A search warrant must be as broad, and
no broader, than justifying the basis of fact. .It is not
every kind of property that may be seized under a search
warrant. It is intended that the warrant be issued with
the privilege to seize such property as was used as the
means of committing a felony. All papers and docu-
ments which afford evidence'that a felony has been com-
mitted, but which were not the means of committing it,
are immune from seizure.' Veeder v. United States, 252
F. 414, 164 C.C.A. 338." 39
The law of the Kirvin case was affected by the Supreme
Court decision in Marron. In United States v. Poller 40 the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit, speaking
through Circuit Judge Learned Hand, announced that it
would follow the Marron decision, and adopted the "things
directly used in the crime" definition of objects of seizure.
of the *holding regarded the papers as being within the "required
records exception" to the fourth and fifth amendments originally
expressed in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32, 33 (1948).
38 5 F.2d 282 (2nd Cir. 1924).
39 Id. at 285. This statement was cited with approval in United
States v. Snow, 9 F.2d 978, 979 (D. Mass. 1925); and questioned
in Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1925), the lower
court opinion of Marron v. United States, supra note 12.
40 Supra note 26.
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In United States v. Thomson 41 in the course of a search,
not upon a search warrant, seventeen mail bags of books,
papers, and documents were seized. The search arose out of
a mail fraud situation. The district court ruled against de-
fendant on a motion to suppress evidence seized through
the allegedly illegal search. The circuit court reversed the
decision on the ground that the search was unreasonable.
The court relied heavily on the line of cases following Goul-
ed, and in particular Lefkowitz. Recognizing the confusion
in the lower federal courts, the court chose to rely solely on
the Supreme Court cases.
In reversing the decision, the court assumed the follow-
ing:
"* * * That neither the length of the search at the time
of the arrest, nor the volume of the evidence seized has
anything to do with the validity of the search. * * *
"The right to search when defendant is arrested is no
greater than when the search is made pursuant to a
search warrant. * * *
"A valid search may result in the seizure of papers as
well as other kinds of property. The test is not the na-
ture of the property seized (papers or liquor for in-
stance), but whether such property was by the accused
used in perpetrating a crime. * * *
"Where the papers of the accused are seized upon a
search solely for use as evidence of a crime of which
respondents were accused or suspected, the search may
be described as unreasonable. * * *" 42
A search incident to arrest for defrauding and conspir-
ing to defraud the government was held to be unreasonable
in United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co.43 Numerous
41 113 F.2d 643, 129 A.L.R. 1291 (7th Cir. 1940).
42 Id. at 645.
43 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 155 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 829 U.S. 826 (1946).
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documents and papers were taken, but none of the articles
seized had any connection with the crimes with which the
defendant was charged. The court concluded that the search
was made solely for evidence which would connect defen-
dant with the crimes charged, and thus unreasonable with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, stating that "the
right to search * * * does not include the right to explore
the house of an accused for evidence which may incriminate
him." 44
The case of Takahashi v. United States lays down as a
general principle that "A reasonable seizure can only be
made of instrumentalities of the crime itself and not of
private papers which are mere evidence or indicia of the
commission of a crime." 45 The court in answering the argu-
ment of the government that the papers seized were instru-
mentalities of the crimes charged, various counts concern-
ing trading with an enemy country, held that the papers
seized were only evidences of the intent to commit a crime
and not instrumentalities. The court clearly distinguished
between the validity of the search and the validity of the
seizure, indicating that though the search be valid still cer-
tain property may not be seized.46
In a more recent decision, United States v. Lerner 47 the
accused was arrested pursuant to a warrant charging him
with harboring or concealing a fugitive. 48 Without search
warrant, but incident to the arrest, the arresting officers
searched the accused's apartment seizing numerous records,
letters and other private papers. It was held that Harris
required the seizure to be held invalid since the objects seiz-
ed were not fruits of crime, instrumentalities of crime, wea-
pons of escape or properties the possession of which is a
crime. The court judged the objects seized to be merely
evidentiary materials tending to connect the defendant with
the crime for which he was arrested. The court considered
44 Id. at 872.
45 143 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1944).
46 Id.
47 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1071.
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Harris, summarized above, to be the test which had to be
met.
Another decision applying the Harris formula is Honig
v. United States. 49 In a search which had been consented to
prior to arrest, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
seized an identification card, a rubber stamp used to make
the imprint on the identification card of the name of a gov-
ernment agency, and seven blank stock certificates. The
encounter arose from charges that the defendant was im-
personating a federal officer and had used the assumed po-
sition to obtain a deed of trust from an unsuspecting indivi-
dual. There was no search warrant.
The rubber stamp was held to be within the instrumen-
tality category since it was the "means relied upon and em-
ployed by appellant to effect his unlawful impersonation
and was entitled to be seized on this basis."
Commenting upon the seizure of the blank stock certifi-
cates, the court stated:
"* * * there is nothing to show that they had in any
way been a means or an instrument in what appellant
had done. Furthermore, like the other legal documents
and papers contained in his brief case, they were capable
of a proper general possession, and they could not be
said, except as a matter of projective suspicion, to have
had any other actual basis in his hands. It would per-
haps be entirely logical for the officers to assume at the
time of the arrest that the certificates had some rela-
tionship to appellant's unlawful acts, but when no such
relationship, as a means or as a fruit of the crime with
which appellant was charged, was capable of being es-
tablished on the hearing to surpress, the seizure could
not be upheld on the ground of any mere evidentiary
value of which they might be possessed, * * *" 50
49 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953).
50 Id. at 921.
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The lawful possession argument included in the extract
above is a reflection of the "draft card" situation in Harris.
The quotation to indicate that the burden is on the govern-
ment to show that an object seized is an instrumentality
rather than mere evidence.51
Recent reports have included two important cases. The
first, Application of Houlihan52 involves a motion to sup-
press property seized by Internal Revenue agents in a raid
on a suspected gambling establishment. The property was
seized upon a search warrant describing the property to be
seized as bookmaking records, wagering paraphernalia,
consisting of bet slips, run-down sheets, and other records
pertaining to wagering operations which were being used
in violation of Sections 4411, 4412 and 7203 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
In the execution of the warrant the following items were
seized: A spiral notebook #490, listing daily gains and los-
ses; two address books; a telephone book; a letter with en-
velope; a large sheet of paper, showing a computation table;
a personal card; two note pads; and 'two envelopes with rate
sheets.
In deciding the instrumentality question raised by pe-
titioner's claim that the property seized was not that de-
scribed in the warrant, the court reasoned as follows:
"It is not here contended that possession of the ar-
ticles seized from the Petitioner was or is a crime. At
the hearing both special agents testified that possession
of the property seized was not in itself illegal and that
some of the articles could be used for wagering purpos-
es. The Sections of the Internal Revenue Code, of 1954,
which Petitioner was allegedly violating do not make it
a crime to engage in wagering operations but simply
impose a tax and require the party to register. Proper-
ty not being used as the means of committing a crime
51 Accord: United States v. Snow, 9 F.2d 978, 979 (D. Mass. 1925);
see Application of Houl~han, 31 F.R.D. 145 (D. N. Dak 1962).
52 31 F.R.D. 145 (D. N. Dak. 1962).
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is not properly the subject of a search warrant. The
property is merely evidentiary material, and a search
for evidence, as such, violates the Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, * * *" 53
Petitioner's contention that the warrant was illegally
executed was apparently disregarded by the court, but a
want of probable cause for issuance of the search warrant
was found to be an additional ground for suppression of all
the evidence obtained in the raid as well as all information
obtained from petitioner at such time.
The court's reasoning, quoted above, is interesting.
Since the crime charged was the failure to register and pay
the occupational tax on wagering, 54 it does not seem correct
that the means or instrumentalities of gambling would not
be instrumentalities of that crime. If this statement is cor-
rect the question must be asked: what is its effect upon
United States v. Clancy 55 where it was held that gambling
paraphernalia consisting in part of records used in the com-
mission of the crime of knowingly attempting to defeat and
evade the wagering excise tax becomes a part of the outfit
or equipment actually used to commit the offense. Obvious-
ly, a distinction is the difference in the crimes charged, one
being the failure to pay a set tax on the occupation, and the
other, evading an excise tax which varies with -the amount
of wagering done. Even in the latter case, the gambling,
and the possession of the gambling paraphernalia, includ-
ing the records, is not the crime. It is the failure to return
and pay the ten per cent excise tax.
In Houlihan the court places weight upon the fact that
the articles in themselves are unoffending, and that there
is nothing unlawful in their possession. The same reason-
ing would seem to apply to Clancy. The reasoning of the
two cases appears, therefore, to be inconsistent.
53 Id. at 149.
54 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 4411, 4412.
55 Supra note 37.
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The second recent case deserving detailed consideration
is United States v. Boyette 51 The prosecution in the Boyet-
te case was for procuring interstate transportation of a
woman for purposes of prostitution. The search arose out
of an arrest, pursuant to a warrant, for the aforementioned
offense. The entry of the officers was admittedly lawful.
Before the issuance of the arrest warrant, the woman
allegedly transported for the purpose of prostitution in-
formed the officers that a record of each of her "transac-
tions" at the truck-stop restaurant belonging to two of the
defendants, was kept upon a separate "guest check" which
was used in determining her share of the profits. In the
course of the search, incident to the arrest of defendants,
three of the "guest checks" were seized. At the trial the
victim of the interstate transportation could not identify
as being in her handwriting the receipts seized, but did
maintain that they were similar in all respects to the ones
she had kept. The guest checks were found in a drawer in
the kitchen and in a waste basket in one of the bedrooms
allegedly used for the purpose of prostitution.
The majority opinion recognized that though the search
be reasonable, not every article is subject to seizure, and
commented that a personal diary in which an individual
had recorded his conduct would not be a proper object of
seizure. It was reasoned that this would be the same situa-
tion as any other involuntary confession, and within the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
Holding, however, that the receipts were instrumentali-
ties properly seized, the majority opinion stated as follows:
"The guest checks here were not instrumentalities
for the accomplishment of the specific crime with which
the Moorings were charged, the interstate transporta-
tion of a particular woman for purposes of prostitution.
They were, however, instrumentalities used in the op-
eration of the brothel, the general criminal enterprise
56 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844 (1962). Jus-
tice Douglas was of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.
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of which the interstate transportation of women was but
a part. * * * it, is revelant and material to the interstate
transportation charge to show that the establishment to
which the woman was carried was in fact operated for
purposes of prostitution. * * * At the time of seizure,
of course, the agents could not know whether those par-
ticular checks were those upon which the complaining
victim had recorded her earnings, or whether they were
records made by other prostitues of theirs. * * * We
think they were properly subject to seizure as instru-
ments used in the operation of the bawdy house, the
criminal enterprise in which the Moorings were engag-
ed. They were instrumentalities of the crime in the same
sense that the ledger and bills for utility services were
instrumentalities of the crime of operating a barroom,
as was held in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
* * *" 57
One has only to read the dissenting opinion by Chief
Judge Sobeloff, of the Fourth Circuit .Court of Appeals, to
realize the problems of the above-quoted opinion.58 Chief
Judge Sobeloff, after reviewing the leading cases, among
others, Harris and Boyd, attempts to discredit Marron,
which was relied upon by the majority opinion. Go-Bart
and Lefkowitz were thought by Chief Judge Sobeloff, to
narrow the Marron case, which had in turn changed the law
stated in Boyd and Gouled.
With regard to Marron, the dissenting opinion reasons
as follows:
"* * * In light of these two latter cases [Go-Bart and
Lefkowitz] it is apparent that Marron has been severe-
ly damaged, if not destroyed, as authority for a general
rule that would treat records as instrumentalities of
crime.
"One can readily perceive the justification for Mr.
Justice Butler's deliberate narrowing of Marron and
57 Id. at 95.
58 The majority opinion in Boyette has been criticized in another
place: 4 BARRON FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-
RULES EDITION § 2403 at note 33.2 (1951, Supp. 1962).
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return to Boyd and Gouled. There is a strong public in-
terest, although unrelated to facilitating the conviction
of the arrested person, for permitting seizure of the
classes of articles mentioned in the rule as stated in the
Lefkowitz and Harris aes. * * * The purpose in seiz-
ing the instrumentality by which the crime was commit-
ted is to prevent its possible use in the commission of
additional crimes. Illegally possessed property may be
taken for the same reason.
"* * * It is indeed difficult to see how these papers,
if the officers had not taken possession of them, could
possibly be used to perpetrate further crimes. Yet this
is the sole justification for seizing the instrumentalities
of a crime in the face of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
hibitions.5 9
Of the many cases reviewed, the Boyette dissent was the
only opinion found which stated with sufficient clarity the
reason for the rule allowing seizure of the instrumentality
of crime. Viewing the other decisions in the light of the
reasoning in the Boyette dissenting opinion, the rationale
set forth in them, justifying the various seizures of records,
does not appear unquestionable. For instance, in Claoncy
60
the records involved would not appear to be capable of being
used further to evade the taxes of the United States, if they
were capable of being so used originally.
Dealing further with the issue, Chief Judge Sobeloff ex-
pressed the view that he could not understand how the re-
ceipts in question could be termed "instrumentalities" with-
in the normal meaning of those words, commenting as fol-
lows:
* * * The crime with which these defendants are
charged is the transportation of a woman in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes. The guest checks were
introduced as documentary proof of the immoral pur-
59 United States v. Boyette, supra note 56, at 97 (citations within
brackets added).
60 Clancy v. United States, supra note 37.
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poses. The checks themselves played no role in the un-
lawful interstate transportation. Nor is there anything
illegal or immoral in possessing these receipts. Being
merely records of illicit activities, and not the means by
which they were done, these receipts are distinctly out-
side the category of items the law permits to be seiz-
ed." 61
An additional point brought out in the dissenting opin-
ion in Boyette is worth of note. Citing Harris 62 and Goul-
ed63, Chief Judge Sobeloff recognizes that a search war-
rant could not validly issue for the purpose of seizing evi-
dentiary materials. This appears to be a correct statement
of the law; and although searches under search warrants
and searches incident to arrest differ in certain respects,
it would seem that uniformity is the proper approach in this
respect.
C. If the cases contained in the above sections have in-
dicated nothing else, they have demonstrated that a confu-
sion exists in the law of searches and seizures on the point
of what may and what may not be seized. The fruits of
crime, weapons of escape, and contraband categories of ob-
jects subject to seizure set out in Harris are clear enough,
but the "means of crime" category has caused difficulty.
It is suggested that lack of definition of the terms means
and instrumentality is the primary cause of the confusion.
The opinions usually recite the rule that evidence may not
be seized, but instrumentalities or means of crime may be
seized. The judges then search for and usually find a way
to treat evidentiary material as a means of crime. The
cases presented have been selected to show that records,
documents, and papers are particularly susceptible to the
confusion.
In the first place papers are exceptionally difficult to
imagine as the means of crime. The cases recognized early
61 United States v. Boyette, supra note 56 at 98.
62 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
63 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
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that there was no special sanctity in papers, and that when
papers are capable of being fitted into the categories of
seizable property, it was proper to seize them. Law en-
forcement officers are primarily interested in gathering
fruits and instrumentalities of crime which can be used to
convict a defendant. That which is an instrumentality of a
crime is most certainly evidentiary in nature. It is diffi-
cult to distinguish when one nature without the other is
present in an object.64
Hence there has been a tendency for the officers, in their
zeal, to seize evidentiary matter which is not an instrumen-
tality or a fruit of crime. There appears also to have been
a mistaken tendency in the cases to justify their actions by
classifying evidence as instrumentality, and so uphold the
seizure. It must be remembered that the guilty as well as
the innocent are entitled to the protection afforded by the
Fourth and Fifh Amendments to the -Constitution.
Since lack of definition of "instrumentalities" seems to
be the problem, it is advisable to recount what the cases
here said by way of definition. Marron offered "used to
carry out the crime" as a definition of instrumentality.
Problems arise when it is necessary to discover where the
crime begins, where it ends, and what actions are properly
called criminal, points which can be just as elusive of defi-
nition as is the instrumentality problem. It is suggested
that this proposed definition is quite as confusing as no
definition, and in fact capable of creating more confusion.
The addition of the word "directly" does not substantially
aid in solution of the problem.
Some of the cases have attempted to use "capable of
lawful possession" to decide the question, but this seems to
also be a mistake. Contraband, is a category in itself among
the objects of lawful seizure, and any instrumentality of
crime which is also incapable of lawful possession would
certainly be a proper object of seizure. However, an object
might be an instrumentality of crime and still not be an
object incapable of lawful possession, unless the fact that
G4 4 BARRON, op. cit. supra. Note 58, at § 2404.
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property has been used as an instrumentality of crime ren-
ders it incapable of lawful possession, and this would com-
plete the circle since there is still no adequate definition of
instrumentality.
Some of the cases have used the words "means" instead
of "instrumentality", but it appears, and the cases so indi-
cate, that the terms are interchangeable, and therefore no
definition results.
In other cases the courts have attempted to solve the
problem by declaring that to be seizable it must be some-
thing in which the public has an interest. This alone is not
sufficient to distinguish instrumentalities from evidentiary
materials since the phrase "public interest" is incapable of
precise definition. The courts might vary in their findings
of "public interest" to -the same degree as they vary in their
findings of instrumentality.
The approach used in the dissenting opinion in Boyette
appears to be the most constitutionally sound. This ap-
proach is best termed a combination of several of the above-
mentioned approaches. Two interests must be balanced.
The interest of the people in being secure in their homes
and not being forced to incriminate themselves, protected
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, must be balanced
with the interest of the government in halting offenses
against the United States. The government must have a
strong interest to justify encroachment upon the personal
liberties of individuals.
The Boyette dissent defines the government interest by
the reason underlying the power given to it to seize in-
strumentalities of crimes. The reason given for the police
power is to insure that the instrumentality of a crime will
not be used to commit additional crimes. In order to deter-
mine whether an object is an instrumentality under this
approach, the court must determine whether the object is
capable of being used to commit additional crimes against
the United States.
The pattern of hypothetical future litigation on the
point is fairly predictable. The argument that records are
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not instrumentalities of a crime would be based upon the
reasoning found in Boyette and Application of Houlizan
with support from the Supreme Court cases of Boyd and
Gouled. In support of the seizure of the records of gambling
operations one would argue upon the basis of Marron and
Claney that the papers were part of the outfit of a crime
which was being committed against the 'United States.
While the length of this paper does not permit a full
discussion, the required records exception set forth in
Clancy, based upon language in Boyd concerning records
required by law to be kept in relation to excisable articles,
it could be argued to justify the seizure of certain records
of a gambling operation. 65
The effect of Go-Bart and Left owitz, upon the Marron
decision is subject to controversy. With this in mind Marron
should be used carefully, and with particular regard for the
jurisdiction in which a case arises.
65 United States v. Clancy, supra note 37.
